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T h E  iN flA TiO N A Ry IM PA C T o f  t H e  V iETN A M
War*
Tom RiddEll
It is more than fifteen years since the US withdrawal from the 
Vietnam War. Enough time has passed to sort out the historical record 
concerning the war and its economic impacts. Like all wars, though, 
there will continue to  be controversy over interpretations of it and its 
effects. There is widespread recognition of the econom ic costs of the 
war and its responsibility for stimulating inflation in the 1960s. The 
increased spending for the war during the economic prosperity of the 
mid-1960s produced pressure on prices. Because economic 
policymakersfailed to  institute corrective policies, inflation accelerated 
by the late 1960sand laid the basis forthe inflationary spiral of the 1970s. 
The econom ic consequences of the Vietnam War were among the 
major factors in creating the economic difficulties faced by the United 
States during the 1970s.
In the 1980s. however. President Ronald Reagan sought to  
reinterpret the history o f the war. He labeled it a "noble cause' and 
tried to  jettison the "Vietnam syndrome'.the critical reevaluation of US 
foreign policy that suggested caution toward military intervention. 
Some economists, also echoing positions from the war years, have 
recently suggested theirown revisionist version of the econom ic im pact 
of the war. They argue that the econom ic burden of the war was trivial, 
tha t it produced only minor inflation in the 1960s, and that it cannot be 
held responsible for the inflationary spiral of the 1970s1.
In this article, I will confront this challenge and reexamine the 
econom ic consequences of the Vietnam War and whether it caused 
an acceleration of inflation in the late 1960s. Such analysis should 
contribute to  our understanding of recent econom ic history and of the 
possible econom ic effects of military expansions — which could 
presumably inform current and future economic policy.
*A previous version of this paper was presented at a Presidential Conference on 
"Lyndon Baines Johnson: A Texan In Washington' at Hofstra University In April 1986, and 
appears In Firestone, Bernard J.; Robert Vogt, eds. Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses 
of Power (Greenwood Press) forthcoming.
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INflATiON iN TtlE 1960s
Table 1 presents data on various measurements of annual rates 
of inflation from 1960 to 1971. This data demonstrates the source of the 
conclusion by most professional economists and the public that the 
acceleration of inflation was linked with the Vietnam War.
For the period 1960-1964. the Consumer Price Index, the 
Producer Price Index and the GNP deflator all show relatively low and 
stable rates of inflation In a range of less than 1 percent to less than 2 
percent. The average annual changes in these three different measures 
of price increases were barely above 1 percent. This trend continued 
the low rates of inflation experienced in the late 1950s. But with the 
escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965, there was an acceleration in the 
rates of increase in all of these measures of price levels.
From December 1964 to December 1965, the unadjusted CPI 
increased by 1.9 percent, up from 1.2 percent the previous year. This 
was followed by an increase of 3.4 percent in 1966,3 percent in 1967, 
4.7 percent in 1968, and 6.1 percent in 1969. A similar pattern of 
accelerating inflation emerges in the year-to-year, adjusted CPI 
changes. The annual percentage increases in the GNP price deflator
TAblE 1
INflATiON D urInq tHe VIETNAM War PERiod, 1960 TO 1971
Year Change In 
Consumer 
Price Index, 
Decem ber to 
December. 
Unadjusted
Change In 
CPI.Year- 
to-Year, 
Adjusted
C hange In 
P r o d u c e r  
Price Index, 
December to  
D e ce m b e r, 
Unadjusted
Change In 
PPI. Year- 
t o - Y e a r ,  
Adjusted
Annual
Change In GNP 
Im plicit Price 
Deflator
1960 1.5 1.6 1.8 0.8 1.6
1961 0.7 1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.9
1962 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.3 1.8
1963 1.6 1.2 -0.2 -0.3 1.5
1964 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.4 1.5
1965 1.9 1.7 3.3 1.7 2.2
1966 3.4 2.9 2.2 3.2 3.2
1967 3.0 2.9 1.6 1.2 3.0
1968 4.7 4.2 3.1 2.8 4.4
1969 6.1 5.4 4.8 3.7 5.1
1970 5.5 5.9 2.2 3.5 5.4
1971 3.4 4.3 3.2 3.1 5.0
Source: Economic Report o f the President. 1962: 237.295.302.
44 Vietnam Generation
also accelerated from 1965 to 1969 — 2.2 to  5.1 percent. In the two 
series for producer prices, there were marked jumps in the annual rates 
of change in 1965 and 1966, a slowdown in their rate of increase in 1967 
(due to “growth recession'), and renewed acceleration in 1968 and 
1969.
Walker and Vatter contend that the data on inflation don't 
demonstrate an acceleration in inflation until 1968. They base this 
conclusion on an analysis of quarterly changes in annual rates for the 
CPI and the PPI and on the assertion that changes in the price indices 
of less than 3 percent are not significant2.
First of all, the quarterly data on the rate of inflation during the 
period of the Vietnam escalation can be used to measure short-run 
movements in prices and don't necessarily show inflation. But I would 
argue that quarterly data do not provide adequate information on the 
trend in the rate of inflation in the period prior to the escalation, during 
it, and after it. The relevant period is not simply the escalation but rather 
the period surrounding increased spending for the Vietnam War. For 
this more extended time frame, the changes In the annual rates of 
inflation are superior. When economists measure inflation over five to 
ten year intervals, they rely on the annual changes in price indices. 
Secondly, Walker and Vatter refer to a statement in an introductory 
economics textbook about a 2 to 3 percent margin of error in the CPI 
and conclude that any change in it of less than 3 percent amounts to 
“no inflation'3. They transpose this range of uncertainty to 3 percent as 
the standard and use it as an absolute test of the existence of inflation. 
The fact that the CPI is based on a survey and has a margin of errordoes 
not mean that it cannot be used to identify patterns of change in 
consumer prices. It is a consistently measured series over time, and 
economists rely on statistical technique to ensure its ability to reflect 
trends in the prices of goods and services. If economists were not 
allowed a 3 percent margin of error, there is not much that we could 
say about the economy with any degree of confidence.
T I ie  TirviiNQ ANd Im pa c t o f t Lie  V ietnam  W ar E scaLa t Ion
Both economic theory and history suggest that wars usually 
have an inflationary impact. During all of its major wars, the United 
States has experienced increased rates of inflation4. The connection 
between war spending and inflation is based on both conventional 
micro-and macro-economictheory. Increased war spending stimulates 
the demand for labor and raw materials used in war production. 
Increased price pressures develop for these factors of production in 
proportion to the tightness of their markets. These price increases can 
then spread from market to market. The macro-economic effect
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TaM e 2
The EsTiMATEd Incremental ANd Full C osts of D Irect 
A merican MillTARy InvoIvement In iNdo-ChiNA, FIscaI Years
1965-1975
(Billions o f Current Dollars)
Fiscal Year’ Incremental Costs0 Full Costs0
1965 , lb . lb
1966 5.8 5.8
1967 18.4 20.1
1968 20.0 26.5
1969 21.5 28.8
1970 17.4 23.1
1971 11.5 14.7
1972 7.3 9.3
1973 6.2C 7.9°
1974 4. l d 5.0*
1975 2.0d 2.5d
Totals: $114.3 $143.8
'The US Government Fiscal Year for all these years was from  July 1 through June 30, e.g.. Fiscal Year 
1965 was from  July 1,1964 to  June 30,1965.
°Full costs cover all forces, baseline and additional, and equipm ent and materials used In the war. 
Increm ental costs cover the added costs o f fighting the war over and above the normal costs of 
operating the baseline force In peacetim e. These are the tw o methods o f cost accounting fo r the 
war supplied by the Pentagon.
“The figures for Fiscal Year 1965 are most Ikely too low to  cover the buildup o f troops In 1964-1965 and 
the stepped-up air activity In response to  the Gulf o f Tonkin Incident (August 1964) and the Plelku 
attacks (February 1965). Some o f this may have been financed w ith the funding for m ilitary assistance 
fo r South Vietnam . Or It may have Involved the use o f already existing baseline forces. However, this 
activ ity stfl had a cost and should, a t the very least, be Indicated In the full cost o f the war. Some 
baseline forces were diverted to  Vietnam for the 1964-1965 buildup —  the ships tha t were In the Gulf 
o f Tonkin, the a ircraft tha t was a t Plelku, and the planes tha t retaliated against the North as a  result 
o f both o f these Incidents—and probably accounted fo r costs In excess o f $ 100 m illion. Consequently, 
the cost figures largely derived from Departm ent o f Defense accounting which are presented In this 
tab le  must be regarded as conservative estimates o f the actua l costs o f the war.
•These are estimates based on the original and revised budget submissions o f the Departm ent of 
Defense. They reflect the com bined effects o f the US response to  the Spring 1972 Offensive o f the 
North Vietnamese, the US bom bing o f North Vietnam  In December 1972, and the ceasefire obtained 
a t the end o f January 1973.
•Estimates based on the costs o f US military assistance to  Indo-Chlna and the continued presence of 
US air and naval forces In Southeast Asia.
Sources: Riddell, Tom. A Political Economcy o f the American War In Indo-Chlna: Its 
Costs and Consequences, unpublished dissertation (Washington, DC: The American 
University) 1975: 98-99; and, US Department of Defense (Comptroller), The Economlcss 
of Defense Spending (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Oflce) 1972: 149.
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results from the stimulation of aggregate demand in the economy as 
a whole. Government spending to prosecute the war effort is added 
onto total spending in the economy. The new spending creates 
demand for war goods, as well as higher incomes throughout the 
economy that will be spent on non-military goods and services. The 
increased demand for both military and consumer products contributes 
to inflationary pressures in the economy. The inflationary impact of the 
war will depend on the state of the economy, the manner by which It 
is financed, and wartime economic policy. If the economy is close to 
full employment, ceteris paribus, increased war spending will have a 
larger inflationary impact. If the war is financed by printing money or 
by the Federal Reserve lending directly to the Treasury, there will be 
higher inflation. If the government does not increase taxes (or decrease 
non-military spending) to pay for the war. its inflationary impact will not 
be checked.
The issue here is whether the Vietnam War caused increased 
inflation in the 1960s. The analysis will rest on an Investigation of the 
impact of the war (taking into account the magnitude and timing of 
the buildup for the war), the state of the economy at the time, how it 
was financed, and wartime economic policy.
To examine the impact of the war, we must identify the period 
of time when the war made extra demands on the resources of the 
society. Walker and Vatter have determined that the escalation 
period was 1966-1967 when national defense purchases of goods and 
services as a percent of GNP increased5. There are two problems with 
this definition — one of substance and one of measurement.
The US involvement In the war was an unusual event in the 
history of the country; it was an extraordinary occurrence. In this light, 
the effect of war spending lasted for the entire period of time during 
which It was making an extra claim on the society's resources. Table 
2 presents information on the annual costs of the war from Fiscal Year 
1965 to FY1975. The full costs of all forces, equipment and materials 
used in the war amounted to over $140 billion; and the incremental 
costs of fighting the war over and above the normal costs of using 
baseline forces in peacetime were over $110 billion6. While It is true that 
the war placed accelerating demands on resources during the 1966­
1967 period, it is also true that the war made an extra claim on 
resourcesthroughout itstenure (subject to countervailing fiscal policies). 
Walker and Vatter focus only on the period of escalation. Whether 
inflation Is engendered by an escalation is certainly a relevant question; 
but It Is not the only question in determining the Inflationary Impact of 
a war.
Furthermore.from an examination of the data that they present.
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as well as Table 2. it is possible to  identify a different and longer period 
of escalation. Table 2 shows war spending increasing in every Fiscal 
Year from 1966 through 1969. Walker and Vatter note that defense 
purchases as a percent of GNP began to increase in the 3rd quarter of 
1965 (at 7.1 percent), continue to increase in every quarter to the 2nd 
in 1967 (9.0 percent), and then decrease in the 3rd quarter of 1967 (8.6 
percent). This brought the “escalation* to  a close. However, there are 
two Important qualifications to this dating of the escalation. From the 
4th quarter of 1967 to the 2nd quarter of 1968, defense purchases go 
back up to  9.0 percent of GNP. The dating by Walker and Vatter of the 
end of the escalation seems to be at least questionable and certainly 
arbitrary. Based on these figures, it could be argued that the escalation 
lasted Into 1968; only after the second quarter of 1968 were there 
consistent decreases in defense purchases as a percent of GNP7. In 
fact, one could argue thatthe escalation lasted until defense purchases 
as a percent of GNP went back to their pre-war level. By this criterion, 
the escalation would last until the 3rd quarter of 1970 based on 
quarterly data and 1971 on annual data (itwas 7.2 percent in 1965.9.0 
percent in 1967,7.5 percent in 1970, and 6.6 percent in 1971).
The history of the war itself also substantiates the conclusion 
that Walker and Vatter have incorrectly specified the timing of the 
escalation. Spending on the war reached Its peaks in FY1968 and 
FY1969. Recalling the Initial escalation of direct American military 
involvement In the war, the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place in August 
1964 and was followed by an intensification of US bombing of North 
Vietnam and by a massive increase in the number of US military 
personnel in Vietnam. From August 1964 to May 1965 (during FY1965). 
an additional 50,000 troops were sent to Vietnam.
At the end of July 1965. President Johnson announced that the 
administration needed additional funds to wage conflict and that a 
furthersupplemental appropriation would be required in January 1966. 
By the end of 1965, 100,000 people were added to  US forces in 
Vietnam, bringing the total to more than 180XXX). By the end of 1966, 
there were 385XXX) US military personnel in Vietnam. The number 
continued Increasing until the end of 1968 when the total reached 
538XXX)8. The timing of the escalation has much longer boundaries 
than 1966-1967.
The Economic Im pact of t He War
To adequately measure the economic Impact of the war and 
the effectthat It had on Increasing Inflation, It Is necessary to supplement 
national defense purchases of goods and services with other indicators 
of defense activity.
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Table 3 presents some data that will help to measure the 
economic impact of the Vietnam War. National defense purchases 
record payments made by the federal government to  individuals and 
businesses; It is a final indicator of defense activity in the economy. 
Progress payments outstanding represent early payments by the 
Department of Defense to contractors for work in progress; it is an 
Intermediate indicator of defense activity. The other measurements in 
Table 3 are all advance indicators. They measure the volume of 
commitments and contracts that DOD makes with the private sector 
for military goods and services. Military prime contracts, gross obligations 
incurred, and manufacturers' new orders all register activity undertaken 
in the private sector at the behest of the federal government and in
TAblE 5
iNdicATORS of D eFense AcTiviTy, A nnuaI A mounts 
B illioNS of C urrent D oUars, 1964 to  1970
Year
N a tio n a l D efense 
Purchases o f Goods 
and Services
Defense Departm ent 
M ilitary Prime C ontract 
Awards
Defense Departm ent 
Gross O b lig a tio n s  
Incurred, Total
1964 49.0 26.6 55.0
1965 49.4 29.9 58.3
1966 60.3 40.2 73.2
1967 71.5 42.4 81.8
1968 76.9 42.3 87.0
1969 76.3 35.2 81.3
1970 73.5 33.5 80.0
D efense D e pa rtm e n t 
Gross O bligation Incurred. 
Procurement
M anufacturers’ New 
O rders, D efnese 
Products Industries
Defense Departm ent 
Progress Paym ents 
Outstanding
1964 15.6 27.4 3.2
1965 16.6 32.2 3.9
1966 23.6 39.1 5.5
1967 26.5 44.9 7.5
1968 28.3 46.7 8.5
1969 20.9 43.1 9.8
1970 20.1 42.9 9.4
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Defense Indicators 
(November 1972): 36; (October 1976): 31; (October 1977): 31,33; and. (Novemberr 
1977): 31,33.
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advance of actual payment for the work completed. Consequently, 
during periods of military buildups, the advance Indicators are the first 
to signal the impact of the increased demand for military goods and 
services in the economy9.
An examination of the relative changes in these measurements 
of defense activity compared to changes in GNP during the period 
1965-1969 provides information about the timing of the impact of 
Increased military spending on the economy. Table 4 presents the 
annual rates of change for these defense indicators. All of the 
indicators, with the exception of gross obligations incurred, total, 
decreased in 1964. In 1965, along with the escalation of the war. all of 
the indicators increased. The advance indicators all increased by 
much more than national defense purchases, which increased by only 
.8 percent. Military prime contracts (12.5 percent), manufacturers' 
new orders in the defense products industries (17.5) percent, and 
progress payments outstanding (21.9 percent) all increased at a rate
TAblE 4
A nnuaI Rates of CHanqe In D eFense iNdicATORS, 196? to 1969
Year GNP
Current
Dollars
N a t i o n a l  
D e f e n s e  
Purchases o f 
Goods and 
Services
M ilitary Prime 
C ontract 
Awards
M anufacturers' 
New Orders. 
Defense 
Products 
Industries
Departm ent o f 
Defense. Gross 
O b l i g a t i o n s  
Incurred
1965 8.4% .8% 12.5% 17.5% 6.0%
1966 9.4% 22.1% 34.0% 21.4% 25.5%
1967 5.8% 18.6% 5.5% 14.8% 11.8%
1968 9.2% 7.6% - .3% 4.0% 6.3%
1969 8.1% -.8% -4.8% -7.7% -6.6%
D e pa rtm en t o f 
D efense, Gross 
Obligations Incurred, 
Procurement
Defense Departm ent 
Progress Paym ents 
Outstanding
1965 6.4% 21.9%
1966 41.8% 41.0%
1967 12.5% 36.4%
1968 6.6% 13.3%
1969 -25.9% 15.3%
Source: Economic Report of the President. 1983: 233 for GNP growth rate. All others 
from Table 3. Percentage changes all calculated.
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significantly in excess of the growth rate of current GNP (8.4 percent). 
The other advance indicators registered increases only slightly below 
the increase in GNP. In 1966,thepaceofthebuildupaccelerated. The 
annual rates of increase in all of the indicators were larger than the rate 
of increase in GNP — with the increases in most of the advance 
indicators being the largest of all. The buildup slows down somewhat 
in 1967, but the rate of increase of defense purchases, manufacturers' 
new orders, gross obligations incurred, and progress payments 
outstanding are all larger than the growth rate of the GNP. In 1968, the 
indicators (with the exception of progress payments) showthe beginning 
of the end of the escalation period. Military prime contracts actually 
decrease; and defense purchases, manufacturers' new orders, and 
gross obligations incurred (total and procurement) continue their 
increase but at a rate below that of GNP. The indicators for 1969 
(except progress payments) all decrease.
The leading indicators point to the acceleration of defense 
activity in 1965. This activity took place primarily in the private sector as 
military contractors expanded their inventories and their demands for 
raw materials and personnel. The impact of the escalation was 
intensified in 1966 and 1967; in fact, increased military purchases 
accounted for 16.8 percent and 25.9 percent respectively of the 
increases in GNP for these two years. The end of the escalating 
economic effect of the war is somewhat more problematic. The 
leading indicators indicate a deceleration in 1968; but the data on war 
spending (Table 2) show a continued increase through FY1969. Although 
it is not an inarguabie proposition, I would date the period of escalation 
from 1965 through the 2nd quarter of 1969. This was the period during 
which military activity in the private sector and actual spending for the 
war was increasing.
ThE Inflationary Im pact  of tHe V ietnam War
The general effects of wartime escalations—Increased demand 
for resources, a stimulus to aggregate demand, and the timing of the 
impact — all lend support to the hypothesis that the war stimulated 
inflation in 1965.1966, and 1967.
The war increased demand for raw materials, metals, and 
Industrial products. The impact on prices is indicated in a comparison 
of the wholesale price indices for all commodities, metal and metal 
products, and machinery and equipment. Forthe period 1960-1964.all 
ofthese indices declined or increased minimally. In 1965 and 1966.wlth 
the beginning of the war. all showed substantial increases. From 1965 
through 1968, the wholesale price index for all commodities increased 
by 8.2 percent. The index for metals and metal products increased by
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9.2 percent, and the index for machinery and equipment increased by
11.2 percent. Tightened labor markets due to economic expansion 
and the drain of the military draft led to accelerated wage increases 
after 1965. The annual increase in average hourly compensation 
averaged just under 4.0 percent for the 1960-1965 period. But in 1966 
average compensation increased by 6.1 percent; and the average 
annual increase through 1971 was about 7 percent. The bargaining 
position of labor unions reflected tight labor markets. From 1961 to
1964, negotiated settlements produced average annual increases in 
hourly wages of about 3 percent. But, beginning in 1965, the annual 
Increases in negotiated wages began to  accelerate. The increase in 
1965 was 3.7 percent and accelerated to an average annual increase 
of 6.6 percent from 1966 through 1970. In addition to these price and 
wage pressures from the extra demands of the war, the context of the 
economy, the financing of the war, and wartime economic policy 
contribute toan interpretation of the culpability of the warin stimulating 
Inflation throughout the economy.
H ie S tate of tIie Economy
The closer the economy is to full employment, the more 
Inflationary the impact of a war is likely to be. Table 5 contains data on 
the general state of the economy for 1964-1970. In 1965, the ratio of 
actual to potential GNP was 100.1 and remained above 100 through 
1969. Actual GNP is the current value of output in the economy and 
potential GNP Is the value of output if all the resources of the society 
were fully employed. If actual output exceeds potential output, the 
economy is operating above its capacity to produce goods and 
services. Similarly, the unemployment rate was relatively low, given 
post-WorldWar2 experience, and had been decreasing since 1961. In
1965, the capacity utilization rate for manufacturing was at its highest 
level since World War 2 (In excess of rates during the Korean War). 
These data Indicate an economyoperating near or above its capacity 
and In which unanticipated increases In aggregate demand could be 
expected to stimulate Inflationary pressures. The war, moreover, 
coincided with both the 1964tax cutto stimulate the economy and the 
launching of the war against poverty. From 1965 to 1969, actual GNP 
exceeded potential GNP, the capacity utilization rate for manufacturing 
remained In the high 80s, and the unemployment rate continued to 
decrease to 3.5 percent (the lowest it had been since World War 2 
except for the Korean War years). The war escalation took place in an 
expanding economy. It was in this context that the extraordinary 
stimulus of the war contributed to Inflationary pressures in the mid- 
1960s.
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TAblE 9
Mea sures o f ThE GeneraL S ta te  of t Me economy, 1964-1970
Year GNP
Actual/
Potential
Rate of
Unemployment
Capacity Utilization 
Rate.
Manufacturing
1964 98.2 5.2 85.6
1965 100.1 4.5 89.6
1966 102.1 3.8 91.1
1967 101.2 3.8 86.9
1968 101.9 3.6 87.1
1969 101.0 3.5 86.2
1970 97.2 4.9 79.3
Sources: Actual/Potentlal GNP from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Survey of Current Business (April 1982): 25. Unemployment rate and capacity 
utilization rate from Economic Report of the President (1982): 266, 283.
FiNANciNq t Me W ar
But to demonstrate that the warwas a source of inflation, it must 
also be shownthatthe mannerin which itwasfinanced accommodated 
increased war spending and that wartime economic policy did not 
take purchasing power away from other sectors of the economy. 
Revisionists have argued that during the war “tax increases' did 
reduce inflationary pressures,that otherfederal spending was reduced, 
and that monetary policy was not excessively expansionary'0. They 
identifytwo sources oftax increases during the period 1965 to 1968. The 
first was the combination of increasing tax collections in a progressive 
tax system during a period of rising incomes and scheduled increases 
in social insurance taxes. The second was the 1968 surtax passed by 
Congress to help finance the war and relieve inflationary pressures in 
the economy. However, the surtax wasn't passed until July. 1968 and 
after that federal taxes' share of GNP actually decreased. Until the 
passage of the surtax, tax rates did not change during the first three 
years of the war; and there was no significant decrease in personal 
consumption expenditures and disposable personal income as a 
percent of GNP, which would signal the contractionary effect of 
increased taxes". Also, the impact of increased social insurance taxes 
is not so clear.
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Walker and Vatter argue that the increases in social insurance 
taxes were in excess of increased social insurance benefits and 
consequently that this “ is unequivocally anti-inflationary'12. They are 
correct in arguing that social insurance tax collections were increasing; 
they increased their share of total federal receipts from 19.1 percent in 
1965 to 23.0 percent in 197013. Social insurance contributions account 
for about 80 percent of federal trust funds receipts, and throughout the 
duration of the war these trust funds experienced surpluses. These 
surpluses are anti-inflationary only if they are not made available to 
other agents of demand in the economy. However, they were made 
available to the Treasury through the only thing that the Social Security 
Administration,for example, is allowed to do with its surpluses: purchase 
US Treasury securities. The amount of federal debt held by other 
government accounts actually increased more than the amount of 
debt held by the Federal Reserve during the 1965-1969 period. From 
December 1965 to December 1969, total federal debt increased by 
$47,3 billion. The Fed's holdings increased by $16.4 billion, the private 
sector increased its holdings by $1.5 billion, and other government 
agencies increased their holdings by $29.3 billion14. This fact diminishes 
the potentially anti-inflationary impact of increased social insurance 
taxes.
In fact, the contribution of the federal trust funds surpluses 
helped to finance increased war spending. When the Fed lends to the 
Treasury, it creates money. When other federal agencies lend funds to 
the Treasury, it does not directly create money because it merely 
transfers purchasing power from the public to the Treasury. However, 
if the receipts were withheld from circulation, it could have a 
contractionary effect on the money supply. Walker and Vatter present 
data to show that the possible monetary impacts of the war were 
minimal and that there was no excessive money creation in the 
escalation period15. In addition to their neglect of the increase in 
federal debt held by government agencies other than the Fed, the 
data on the growth of the money supply could be interpreted in a 
different way. From 1960 to 1964, the money supply had been 
increasing at an annual rate of less than 3 percent. However, with an 
increasing federal debt, the rate of increase of M1 accelerated to 4.7 
percent in 1965. In 1966, as a result of a Fed decision to tighten up on 
monetary policy in response to  the inflationary effects of the war, M 1 
grew at a rate of only 2.5 percent. When the Fed's attempt at 
contraction was abandoned, money supply growth took off to rates of 
6.6 percent in 1967 and 7.7 percent in 196816.
Walker and Vatter also argue that federal non-defense 
purchases helped to reduce the inflationary impact of the war because
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they decreased as a percent of GNP during the escalation. Regardless 
of the period of escalation, they are correct. But the contribution to 
reduced aggregate demand was minimal, the GNP share of federal 
non-defense purchases decreased from 2.6 percent to 2.4 percent — 
a 7.7 percent fall in its share, whereas the share of defense purchases 
increased during the war buildup by 28.2 percent.
There is one additional factorthat must be analyzed in assessing 
the inflationary impact of the war: the role of wartime economic 
policy, or, rather, the failure of economic policymakers to  institute any 
effective constraints on aggregate demand. As Keith M. Carlson, 
writing in the Federal Reserve BankofSt. Louis Reviewin February 1967, 
pointed out:
A t times o f high em ploym ent and near-capacity levels o f 
output, a resource transfer from civilian to  m ilitary use is 
norm ally e ffected  by either tax Increases or a system of 
Governm ent controls. Neither route was follow ed w ith respect 
to  the V ietnam  buildup in la te 1965 and 1966. Instead a price 
mechanism was utilized to  e ffe c t the resource transfer, l.e., 
the Federal Governm ent bid aw ay goods and services from 
civilian use for the w ar effort.
Overall price Increases thus operated as a silent tax 
In the absence o f more restrictive fiscal or m onetary actions'7.
The question thus becomes: what was the economic policy response 
to the war and why did it fail?
The Economic Policy Failure During the War
There are two questions relevant to an assessment of economic 
policy during the war. One concerns the awareness of policymakers 
to the inflationary effects of the war. The other concerns the lack of an 
effective policy to counter those impacts. Both economic theory and 
history suggest that wars induce inflation. In all its previous wars, the 
United States adopted a variety of measures to dampen inflation. 
These have included increased individual and corporate income 
taxes, excise taxes, wage and price controls, and rationing18.
In the case of the Vietnam War, there was a failure to adopt 
appropriate and sufficient wartime policies to reduce inflationary 
pressures. Thisfailurewasprimarilyaresultofthepoliticsofthewar. The 
war escalated slowly and was initially referred to  as the Vietnam 
“conflict*. Initial cost estimates for the war were outrageously low. 
President Johnson was reluctant to engage in a public debate about 
economic restraint due to the war and, concurrently, about the war 
itself. Furthermore, Johnson wanted to preserve his commitment to the
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Great Society from any budget restraint associated with increased 
spending for the war19.
The war began without a formal declaration. The administration 
introduced increased numbers of troops into Vietnam gradually. And 
it consistently underestimated war costs in its budget submissions to 
Congress. Johnson decided on a path of slow escalation, but one 
which included flexibility20. During Fiscal Years 1965,1966,and 1967,the 
original budget requests for the war were eventually exceeded by 
more than 100 percent in supplemental requests for funds21. Since 
there was no 'w a r ' and since the original requests for funds did not 
foresee a massive increase in spending for the war, the Johnson 
administration did not need to introduce any comprehensive wartime 
economic policy measures.
Nevertheless.there were a number of responses to the increased 
inflationary pressures brought about by prosperity and the effect of the 
Vietnam escalation. Table 6 contains a summary of policy measures or 
proposals to restrain demand in the economy from 1965 through 1968. 
One of the first instances of an administration concern with the 
inflationary effects of the war was a December 1965 CEA 
recommendation to Johnson that he consider a tax increase to help 
pay for the war22. But Johnson refused because he didn't want to 
adopt wartime economic measures for fear of touching off a debate 
on the war of losing some of his Great Society programs23. Throughout 
the remainder of 1966 and 1967, mild policies of restraint were utilized. 
Johnson relied on the CEA's wage-price guideposts and patriotic 
appeals to  dampen inflationary wage and price movements. 
Scheduled reductions in federal excise taxes on telephone service and 
automobiles were rescinded and collections of some federal taxes 
were accelerated. In his Economic Report of the President for 1967, 
Johnson suggested that he might call for an income tax surtax to 
restrain the economy. Finally, in August 1967 he formally proposed a 10 
percent surcharge on income taxes. Congressional hearings were 
held on this proposal in August, September, and November 1967 and 
in January 1968. In these hearings, virtually all of the administration 
officials and others who testified acknowledged the responsibility of 
the war in making the surtax necessary. But the proposal stalled over 
congressional desires to cut non-defense federal spending and 
Johnson's unwillingness to compromise over his Great Society programs. 
In early 1968,the economic environment deteriorated with accelerating 
inflation, a massive increase in the budget deficit, and an international 
monetary crisis. At this point, congressional leaders and administration 
officials worked out a compromise that called for the income tax 
surcharge in return for a commitment to cut non-defense federal
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TAblE 6
Economic Policy Responses to tIie Impact of ThE V ietnam War,
1969 to 1968
D ate Policy A c tio n
December 1965 Federal Reserve raises discount rate from 4% to 4 1/2%.
January 1966
Council of Economic Advisers sends tax Increase request 
to  Johnson, which he rejects.
President Johnson proposes accelerated corporate and 
individual Income tax collections and a revision of the 
scheduled eliminations of the federal automobile and
March 1966
telephone excise taxes.
Johnson holds meetings with Congressional and business 
leaders In which they back his reluctance to raise taxes to 
finance the war.
September 1966 Federal Reserve sends letter to commercial banks urging 
restraint In business loans.
Johnson announces restraint on federal non-defense 
spending and requests a 16 month suspension of the 7% 
investmenttax credit and of accelerated depreciation on 
business construction.
Fall 1966 Administration falls to  release a Midyear Review of the
January 1967
Budget.
Johnson proposes a 6%Income tax surcharge on corporate 
and Individual Income.
March 1967 Johnson requests the relnstltution of the 7% Investmenttax 
credit.
August 1967 Johnson firms up his tax surcharge request and asks for a 
10% surcharge on Income taxes.
January 1968 Johnson proposes broad series of measures to directly 
control Increasingly difficult balance o f payments 
problems.
March 1968 Johnson holds another series of meetings with business 
leaders In which the economic Impact of the war is more 
forthrightly discussed than previously.
Johnson with draws from the approaching 1968 Presidential 
election and announces steps to negotiate an end to the 
war.
June 1968 Congress finally enacts the 10% income tax surcharge to 
help finance the Increasing costs of the war.
Sources: Economic Report o f the President. 1965 to 1970; and, Riddell, A Politlcd 
Economy o f the American War In Indo-Chlna: 333-334.
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spending by $6 billion in the FY1969 budget. The surtax finally becam e 
law on June 28,1968.
Some measures of economic restraint were used during the 
escalation period, but they were inadequate. Why? The war was 
escalated slowly and by stealth. Within the administration, there were 
predictions and plans for a much longer and costlier war. Yet, in public, 
the posture was confidence in a contained, successful and "cheap* 
conflict. As Johnson himself quotes one of his major advisers, McGeorge 
Bundy, in his memoirs: "At its very best the struggle in Vietnam will be 
long. Itseemsimportanttousthatthisfundamentalfact be made clear 
and our understanding of it made clear to our own people.... fTjhere 
is no shortcut to success in Vietnam. *M This evaluation of the reality of 
US involvement in Vietnam and where it was likely to  lead was not 
shared with the public (at least not until the publication of the Pentagon 
Papers). Consequently, there was no public reason to  ask for typical 
wartime economic measures. The lack of adequate econom ic policy 
measures and a war stimulus that was larger and would last longerthan 
was adm itted in public went hand in hand. As Walter Heller (Chair of 
the Council of Economic Advisers during the Kennedy administration) 
has put it, there was “an unwillingness to  loose the flood of debate on 
Vietnam for which a tax proposal would provide the tempting 
occasion '25. And Lyndon Johnson wanted very much to  protect his 
Great Society:
We are a  rich nation and can  a ffo rd  to  m ake progress a t 
hom e while m eeting our obligations abroad  — In fa c t, w e 
can  a ffo rd  no o ther course if w e are to  rem ain strong. For this 
reason, I have not ha lted  progress In new  and  v ita l G reat 
Society program s In order to  finance the  costs o f our efforts In 
Southeast Asia26.
Throughout 1965,1966, and 1967, it would be guns and butter 
both. Not until late 1967 and 1968 did the debate about the war and 
wartime econom ic policy get the public airing it deserved given the 
economic impacts of the war. In fact. Johnson himself reaped the 
harvest of secrecy when he renounced the Presidency in March 1968 
as a result of the political and economic ramifications of his conduct 
of the war.
Charles Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget during 
the Johnson administration, summarized this policy failure in 
congressional testimony in 1970 on the economic effects of the war:
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... our earlier inflation Is in part due to the fa c t tha t we w ou ldn 't 
cover the financial costs o f the war In taxes and finally In turn, 
one o f the reasons we w ou ldn 't cover the financial cost o f the 
w ar in taxes was because It was basically an unpopular w ar....
CDhe Inflation tha t w e are trying to  stop originated from a 
com bination o f the Vietnam  war on the one hand and our 
politica l inability to  finance it on the other27.
The Vietnam Warstimulated inflation in the mid- and late-1960s. 
This result was a combination of the economic Impact of the war, the 
state of the economy at the time, the manner in which the war was 
financed, and the conduct of economic policy. Given the structure of 
the economy and the institutional power of large corporations and 
labor unions .this inflation produced further cost-push sources of inflation. 
This inflationary experience laid the foundation for the increased 
difficulties with inflation in the 1970s — the price-wage spiral, the 
productivity crisis, energy price increases, excessive monetary growth 
and easy credit, and so on.
C oncIusIon
Walker and Vatter concluded in their analysis that the Vietnam 
War was an “economically trivial event' and posed the question of 
what the effect would be if the nation really engaged in a massive 
military escalation. “The profession needs to tell the nation that the 
economic barrier to war, its appalling economic costs, has been 
destroyed by the tremendous size of our economy. Consequently, 
we'd better erect stronger political and social barriers or we will have 
more w ar.'28
I have shown that the Vietnam War was by no means a trivial 
economic event. It increased the percentage of the nation's resources 
going to defense purposes by only 2 percent of GNP, but it also lasted 
for almost a decade and cost the Treasury almost $150 billion. It 
induced accelerated inflation. The nation continues to bear the 
economic costs of that war in interest payments on the debt incurred 
during the war, programs for Vietnam veterans, and lost output from 
disabled and disoriented veterans. There were and are economic 
burdens of the Vietnam War — to go along with the political, social, 
and cultural upheavals it unleashed in the United States in the 1960s 
and 1970s. It is a lesson that economists bear a responsibility for 
sharinglt is also a lesson that has relevance to the current massive 
peacetime military buildup of the Reagan administration Through 
FY1990, this escalation calls for military spending of almost $2.7 trillion29. 
The defense share of GNP will increase from 5.6 percent to 7.1 percent 
ofGNP. Butthat 1.5 percentshare of GNPinvolvesa significant amount
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of spending and the opportunity cost is always the other things that 
those resources could have been used for — education, tax cuts, 
public works projects, job training programs, etc. There is still a choice 
between guns and butter. Toarguethatthisbuildupistrivialminimalizes 
the burden that it places on the country's resources. The revisionist 
position on the economic effects of the Vietnam War also feeds into 
recent attempts to undermine the "Vietnam syndrome' and to pursue 
more aggressive interventionist foreign and military policies like those 
of the Reagan administration in Central America and the Middle East. 
Walker and Vatter are correct to urge strong political and social 
barriers to the pursuit of war. But US citizens also need to be aware of 
the substantial economic burdens associated with military buildups in 
times of war and peace.
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